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1 
Washington University 
Journal of Law & Policy  
Access to Justice: Evolving Standards in 
Juvenile Justice: From Gault to Graham  
and Beyond 
Introduction 
Mae C. Quinn  
As suggested by the title of this symposium, the juvenile justice 
system is in flux. This state of transformation is nothing new, 
however. It is a process that has been in progress for over one 
hundred years. It is one that is likely to continue. And it is the topic 
explored in this volume by leading youth advocate-scholars who, 
collectively, have spent over one hundred years representing young 
people in juvenile courts and through law school clinical programs 
across the country.
1
  
This collection of articles explores the ongoing evolution of 
juvenile justice standards, sharing important theoretical insights about 
the current state of the law as well as experience-based lessons from 
committed juvenile practitioners who confront important youth 
justice issues in our communities and courts. It is being published in 
conjunction with Washington University‘s 12th annual Access to 
 
  Professor of Law and Co-Director, Civil Justice Clinic—Juvenile Rights and Re-Entry 
Project (JR-REP), Washington University School of Law.  
 1. These advocate-scholars are as follows: Kristin Henning, Tamar Birckhead, Randy 
Hertz, and Martin Guggenheim, Lourdes Rosado, Kim McLaurin, and Sandra Simkins and Lisa 
Geis (with Dr. Marty Beyer) (in order of appearance in this issue). 
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Equal Justice Colloquium, which this year sought to bring together 
stakeholders from the national, state, and local levels to share and 
build juvenile justice expertise during a day-long conference.
2
 Our 
goal was to consider where we have been, where we are now, and 
where we might go in the future to ensure the delivery of substantive 
justice for vulnerable youth, with some emphasis on the particular 
challenges presented by Missouri‘s juvenile justice system.  
Most juvenile law scholars agree that the juvenile justice 
movement began during the Progressive Era, where reformers called 
upon the state as parens patriae to protect wayward children rather 
than punish them like adults.
3
 Typical of the sentiments of the day, in 
1898, one child advocate declared: 
 We make criminals out of children who are not criminals 
by treating them as if they were criminals. That ought to be 
stopped. What we should have, in our system of criminal 
jurisprudence, is an entirely separate systems of courts for 
children . . . who commit offenses which would be criminal in 
adults. We ought to have a ―children‘s court‖ . . . and we ought 
to have a ―children‘s judge,‖ who should attend to no other 
business. We want some place of detention for those children 
other than a prison.
4
 
 
 2. The event was sponsored by the Washington University Clinical Legal Education 
programs and organized by the Juvenile Rights and Re-Entry Project. Other sponsors and 
supporters include the Office of the Missouri the State Public Defender, the National Juvenile 
Defense Center, and the Gephardt Institute for Public Service. Numerous individuals also 
deserve thanks for helping to organize this important event, including: Katie Herr, Clinical 
Programs Manager; Kathryn Pierce, JR-REP Lecturer-in-Law and Supervising Attorney; and 
Katie Harrington and Jake Peterson, Editor-in-Chief and Managing Editor of this Journal. I am 
also grateful to our Fall 2011 JR-REP student attorneys Alexandra Appatova, Eric Buske, 
Molly Carney, Paul Cotter, Anthony Davidson, Christopher Hamilton, David Huddleston, 
James McFall, Hani Mirza, Hung Ou Yang, J. Benjamin Rosebrough, and William Waller for 
their hard work, zealous advocacy on behalf of young people, and brilliant teaching, which 
helped inspire the issues addressed at this Colloquium.  
 3. DAVID S. TANENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN: IN RE GAULT 
AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 4 (2011) (describing parens patriae as ―the paternalistic idea of the state 
as a father‖). 
 4. ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 132 
(40th Anniversary ed. 2009) (quoting Frederick Wines, Proceedings of the Illinois Conference 
of Charities (1898)).  
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Heeding calls like these, efforts to employ new approaches in 
youth justice spread in the form of specialized juvenile courts. The 
first such institution, established in Chicago, Illinois in 1899, came to 
serve as a national model.
5
 Under this framework, young people were 
to be excluded from the traditional criminal justice system and 
instead were to receive individualized treatment in a more 
rehabilitative and less legalistic setting.
6
 The focus of this first wave 
of courts was described by Judge Julian Mack:  
 The problem for determination by the judge is not, Has this 
boy or girl committed a specific wrong, but What is he, how 
has he become what he is, and what had best be done in his 
interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a 
downward career.
7
 
Thus the status and condition of the youth, rather than their specific 
behavior, called for state intervention. Judge Mack continued, ―It is 
apparent at once that the ordinary legal evidence in a criminal court is 
not the sort of evidence to be heard in such a proceeding.‖8 Instead, a 
―thorough investigation, usually made by the probation officer,‖ was 
more important, ―giv[ing] the court much information bearing on the 
heredity and environment of the child.‖9  
Probation investigations spanned the domain of the ―psycho-
physical,‖ including data about the child‘s mental, physical, and 
emotional condition, which might provide clues for the court about 
how to best ―change . . . [his or her] character.‖10 Indeed, borrowing 
from the medical model, advocates of the juvenile court model 
believed it should serve as a ―palliative‖ and ―curative‖ institution 
rather than a court of law.
11
 Thus, treatment intervention through 
informality took hold in juvenile courts during the first half of the 
last century.
12
 Missouri established its first such court in 1903.
13
 
 
 5. TANENHAUS, supra note 3, at 4. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 119–20 (1909). 
 8. Id. at 120. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 122; see also PLATT, supra note 4, at 142 (―The role model for juvenile court 
judges was doctor-counselor.‖). 
 12. See, e.g., Cinque v. Boyd, 121 A. 678 (Conn. 1923) (describing the juvenile court 
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But as Paul W. Tappan, a contemporary commentator and scholar, 
observed at the time: 
Despite the wide extension of a humanitarian philosophy in the 
child-welfare movement during the twentieth century, the 
treatment of the delinquent reflects a serious confusion of 
methods and purposes. The greatest difficulty lies in the huge 
gap between ideals and reality, between the realm of thought 
about and action toward the delinquent. It frequently appears 
that what most people say about the child (expressing the most 
benevolent intentions) has utterly no relation to what they do. 
Often neither what they say or do is very realistic in relation to 
the child‘s behavior and his needs.14 
Tappan described a system where young people accused of a wide-
range of alleged wrongdoings—some acts mere youthful 
indiscretions not even prohibited by the criminal code—were 
committed to out-of-home placements such as detention centers or 
residential programs.
15
 These facilities were run by some of the same 
rigid rules and offered the same kind of harsh environment as adult 
jails and prisons.
16
  
If not so committed, such youth often were placed on probation 
supervision for indefinite periods of ―adjustment‖ time to be 
monitored and corrected.
17
 Dispositions such as these were handed 
down without accused children being aided by the assistance of 
counsel and frequently without any formal finding of guilt.
18
 Tappan 
 
movement as it unfolded, collecting cases from around the country upholding the establishment 
of state juvenile court systems); see also DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, A VERY SPECIAL PLACE IN 
LIFE: THE HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE IN MISSOURI (2003) (describing the evolution of 
juvenile justice practices in the state of Missouri). 
 13. ABRAMS, supra note 12, at 45–46. 
 14. Paul W. Tappan, Prevention and Treatment of Delinquency, in SOCIAL PROBLEMS 235 
(1950). Tappan was a New York University sociology and law professor who spent decades 
studying the workings of lower courts, including juvenile and wayward minors‘ courts. See id.; 
see also, e.g., PAUL TAPPAN, DELINQUENT GIRLS IN COURT: A STUDY OF THE WAYWARD 
MINOR COURT OF NEW YORK (1947); PAUL TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE AND CORRECTION 
(1960). 
 15. Tappan, Treatment of Delinquency, supra note 14, at 236–40. 
 16. Id. at 236–40. 
 17. Id. at 246–59. 
 18. Id. at 238–40. 
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argued that the efficacy of these interventions, delivered by many 
who were untrained in the fields of mental health or psychology, 
offered questionable results.
19
 Thus, although clearly well-intended, 
these localized innovations came to be seen by many as lacking fair 
processes, unduly paternalistic, and vulnerable to abuses of 
discretion.
20
  
Others, too, saw the emerging model as dangerous in its threat to 
the autonomy of impacted adolescents. Leading juvenile court critic 
Anthony Platt saw the institution‘s practices as not only class-based 
and condescending but also part of a state-run system of control that 
discounted vulnerable populations and virtually erased their 
personhood: 
 The benevolent philosophy of the juvenile court often 
disguises the fact that the offender is regarded as a ―non-
person‖ who is immature, unworldly, and incapable of making 
effective decisions with regard to his own welfare and future. 
Genuine attention is rarely paid to how the offender feels and 
experiences his predicament; . . . the present structural 
arrangement of the juvenile court is likely to invite regression 
and diminish self-respect in its ―clients.‖21 
More than this, not all youth who faced charges were provided with 
the option of juvenile court. Through their juvenile codes, individual 
states established various, sometimes conflicting, criteria that would 
exclude certain youth from juvenile courts‘ purported protective 
embrace. These included disparate jurisdictional age cut-offs, 
statutory exclusion of certain serious crimes, and discretionary 
rejection of children who appeared to be beyond reform.
22
 In 1954, 
 
 19. Id. at 262–76. 
 20. See generally id.; PLATT, supra note 4. 
 21. PLATT, supra note 4, at 160. 
 22. See, e.g., People v. Roper, 181 N.E. 88, 90–92 (N.Y. 1932) (explaining that in the 
1930s, New York youth charged with serious crimes such as first degree murder were not 
covered by the jurisdiction of juvenile court); State v. Monahan, 104 A.2d 21 (N.J. 1954) 
(describing how during the 1940s and 1950s, half the states vested juvenile courts with 
exclusive jurisdiction for youth under sixteen years of age); Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541 (1966) 
(describing D.C. Code sec. 11-914, which allowed for judicial waiver after ―full investigation‖ 
of any youth charged with any act that would be a felony if committed by an adult). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the New Jersey Supreme Court offered a sketch of the wide-range of 
approaches: 
There remain . . . strongly conflicting opinions as to how 
juveniles should be dealt with in cases involving homicide and 
other heinous misconduct. Some . . . fail to suggest any 
alternative except, perhaps, the return to the barbarous days 
when eight and ten-year-old boys and a 13-year-old girl were 
tried and executed for arson and murder.
23
  
It went on: 
Others take the view that although the juvenile court 
movement is soundly based and should be strengthened, it 
should nevertheless be confined to non-heinous offenses, at 
least when older children are concerned; in other words, errant 
children should receive supervision and correction but only so 
long as they have not erred too greatly. Still others, however, 
urge both the strengthening and widening of the juvenile court 
movement, pointing out that the grossness of the child's 
misconduct intensifies rather than lessens the need for 
corrective supervision under the jurisdiction of a specialist 
judge, empowered to protect fully both the interests of the 
child and the public at large.
24
 
Thus, despite the country‘s alleged new orientation towards treating 
juveniles as a class different from adults,
25
 there was no clear 
consensus around which young people were worthy of juvenile court 
treatment or how that decision should be made. Countless youths 
therefore found themselves ushered into criminal courts to face harsh 
adult sentences during this period—some executed as a result.26 
 
 23. Monahan, 104 A.2d at 27. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: 
The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C.L. REV. 1083, 1097 (1991) (―[T]he 
Progressives fashioned a discrete juvenile justice system premised upon the belief that, like 
other children, adolescents are not morally accountable for their behavior.‖). 
 26. See Roper, 181 N.E. at 92 (noting that a child convicted of first-degree murder, with a 
sufficiently guilty mind and specific intentionality, could receive the death penalty in New York 
in 1932); see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 832 (1988) (citing to the research of 
Professor Victor Streib, which suggests that between eighteen and twenty juvenile were 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol38/iss1/2
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By the 1960s, questions and concerns about juvenile procedures 
and practices across the country mounted. In what might be seen as 
the second wave in the juvenile court movement, a new generation of 
youth advocates—those steeped in the teachings of the so-called due 
process revolution of that era—pressed for further reform in two 
cases before the Supreme Court.
27
  
First, in 1966, attorneys for Morris Kent, a sixteen-year-old boy 
who had been transferred from the District of Columbia juvenile 
court system into the adult system where he faced the possibility of 
the death penalty for the crime of rape,
28
 took his case to the Supreme 
Court.
29
 It was the first juvenile justice matter the high court heard.
30
 
Kent‘s waiver to criminal court took place under a District of 
Columbia statute which allowed such discretionary determinations to 
be made by the judge upon ―full investigation‖ of any youth facing 
felony charges.
31
 The investigation in Kent‘s case apparently took 
place off the record, behind closed doors, without input from Kent or 
his lawyer, in an ex parte exchange with juvenile court staff.
32
  
Kent‘s attorneys argued that the certification order was unlawful 
because, among other things, ―no hearing was held; because no 
findings were made by the Juvenile Court; because the Juvenile 
Court stated no reasons for waiver; and because counsel was denied 
access to the Social Service file which presumably was considered by 
the Juvenile Court in determining to waive jurisdiction.‖33  
The Court agreed and remanded for certification review. In doing 
so Justice Abe Fortas, writing for the Court‘s majority, joined the 
chorus of critics dubious of the fluid nature of juvenile court 
 
executed during the first half of the last century—the same period as the first wave of the 
juvenile court movement). 
 27. See TANENHAUS, supra note 3, at 53 (―From the perspective of younger lawyers at the 
forefront of the 1960‘s due process revolution, the juvenile court was a suspect institution.‖). 
 28. Id. At the time, rape was still a death-eligible crime. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 
583 (1977) (barring execution for the crime of rape as cruel and unusual punishment). At trial, 
Kent was acquitted of rape based on grounds of insanity but convicted of burglary and robbery. 
Kent, 383 U.S. 541, 550 (1966). He was sentenced to an indeterminate term of thirty to ninety 
years imprisonment. Id. 
 29. Id. at 541. 
 30. See TANENHAUS, supra note 3, at 54. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Kent, 383 U.S at 547. 
 33. Id. at 552. 
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proceedings. He quipped that while juvenile courts were 
―theoretically engaged in determining the needs of the child and of 
society rather than adjudicating criminal conduct,‖ ―the admonition 
to function in a ‗parental‘ relationship is not an invitation to 
procedural arbitrariness.‖34 He went on to hold that given the 
critically important nature of certification proceedings, they needed 
to comport with due process.
35
 Thus, juveniles must at least be 
provided with access to the social file and other evidence to be 
considered by the court, a hearing, express findings supporting the 
waiver decision, and representation throughout by counsel.
36
 
As for the role of counsel, the Court noted that while juvenile court 
proceedings might be informal, they should not become a ―mockery‖ 
by preventing counsel from functioning as effective advocates.
37
 In 
case there was any doubt, Justice Fortas underscored the important 
role of juvenile defense counsel: ―The right to representation by 
counsel is not a formality. It is not a grudging gesture to a ritualistic 
requirement. It is of the essence of justice.‖38 
Interestingly, the parties did not raise, nor did the Court address, 
the legitimacy of sentencing adolescents to harsh adult criminal 
sentences—an issue at least presented by the facts of Kent‘s case.39 
Rather than establishing substantive limits on treating young people 
like adult offenders, the matter was simply handled on procedural 
grounds. But while it was beyond the facts of Kent‘s case, Justice 
Fortas suggested that juveniles whose cases were resolved in juvenile 
court might have similarly viable procedural claims: 
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose of 
juvenile courts, studies and critiques in recent years raise 
serious questions as to whether actual performance measures 
well enough against theoretical purpose to make tolerable the 
immunity of the process from the reach of constitutional 
guaranties applicable to adults. There is much evidence that 
 
 34. Id. at 554–55. 
 35. Id. at 560–62. 
 36. Id. at 547. 
 37. Id. at 561. 
 38. Id. at 561–62. 
 39. See generally id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol38/iss1/2
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some juvenile courts . . . lack the personnel, facilities and 
techniques to perform adequately as representatives of the 
State in a parens patriae capacity, at least with respect to 
children charged with law violation. There is evidence, in fact, 
that there may be grounds for concern that the child receives 
the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections 
accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative 
treatment postulated for children.
40
 
With this pronouncement, Justice Fortas teed up the constitutional 
challenges of Gerald Gault, whose case was heard the following 
term.
41
 Not unlike the scene painted by Tappan in his more general 
critique of juvenile court practices, fifteen-year-old Gault had been 
sent away to a reformatory until the age of twenty-one for allegedly 
making lewd telephone calls to his neighbor.
42
 Gault and his family 
were not provided with legal representation or advance notice of the 
specific legal charges.
43
 Instead, they were brought in for a hearing 
conducted in chambers at which no evidence was presented against 
Gault, nor was he given an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses 
against him.
44
 Yet, Gault was required to respond to questioning by 
the judge about the alleged call, during which he incriminated 
himself in at least one fact concerning who dialed the telephone.
45
  
Arizona law also provided no right to appeal in juvenile 
delinquency matters or transcript of the proceedings.
46
 Nevertheless, 
Gault sought review of his commitment to the State Industrial School 
by way of writ of habeas corpus.
47
 After the writ was denied, Gault‘s 
legal team took the case to the Supreme Court.
48
 Again, Justice 
Fortas offered a biting critique of the arbitrary and ad hoc 
mechanisms that had emerged in juvenile courts in disrespect of an 
entire class of persons—youth. In an oft-quoted line he asserted, 
 
 40. Id. at 556. 
 41. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); see also TANENHAUS, supra note 3, at 53–56.  
 42. Gault, 387 U.S. at 4-10.  
 43. Id. at 4–7. 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. at 6–8, 43–44.  
 46. Id. at 8, 57–58.  
 47. Id. at 8–10. 
 48. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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―Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify 
a kangaroo court.‖49  
Pulling back the curtain on the allegedly benevolent and 
protective features of the courts, Justice Fortas declared that no 
matter how ―euphemistic‖ the title of industrial school might be, it 
was still akin to incarceration and sufficiently ―sentence‖-like to 
require protections of due process before such commitment could be 
imposed.
50
 Such protections included, at least, the right to notice of 
the charges, right to confront the witnesses against you, and the 
privilege against self-incrimination.
51
  
In addressing petitioner Gault‘s right to counsel claim, Justice 
Fortas took on the unique structure of juvenile courts, warning that 
juvenile probation staff—who work to screen cases and gather intake 
information—cannot serve as advocates for the youth.52 As law 
enforcement officials who might be called to testify against the child, 
they stand in legal conflict with them.
53
 The juvenile judge is 
similarly conflicted as the fact-finder, and cannot be called upon to 
protect the child‘s interests.54 Thus, the Court declared that the right 
to counsel, as a juvenile, ―‗requires the guiding hand of counsel at 
every step in the proceedings against him.‘‖55  
Thus, about fifty years into the juvenile court movement, it 
entered a new evolutionary phase, where the pendulum of informal 
proceedings swung back toward more criminal-court-like processes 
and features. Many youth advocates pressed for greater parallels with 
adult prosecutions.
56
 Perhaps the greatest victory on this front from 
the standpoint of juvenile defenders was the application of the proof 
beyond the reasonable doubt standard to delinquency proceedings.
57
 
 
 49. Id. at 28. 
 50. Id. at 27. 
 51. Id. at 31–57. The Court left open the question of a child‘s right to a transcript and 
appeal. See TANENHAUS, supra note 3, at 99. 
 52. Gault, 387 U.S. at 35–36. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. at 36. 
 55. Id. at 36–37. 
 56. See Tamar R. Birckhead, Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice for Juveniles, 57 
BUFF. L. REV. 1447, 1456–62 (2009) (describing the movement to infuse juvenile court 
proceedings with more procedural rights).  
 57. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol38/iss1/2
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Defenders were not the only ones seeking to infuse juvenile 
prosecutions with more adult-like features. During what has been 
dubbed the ―get tough‖ era of the 1970s to the 1990s, victims‘ rights 
groups, law enforcement officials, conservative politicians, and 
others again called for change to ensure more young people faced 
criminal court certification and harsh adult sentences.
58
 Consistent 
with this backlash against treating youth as special, the number of 
teens in adult correctional facilities rose from sixteen hundred in 
1988, to over nine thousand in 1997.
59
 And in some instances death 
sentences were sought and imposed on teens.
60
  
It was in the midst of the ―get tough‖ era that lawyers for youth 
pressed the Court on one of the substantive issues left aside in Kent: 
whether some child sentences are just too harsh to withstand Eighth 
Amendment scrutiny. And in 1988, the Court considered whether a 
sentence of death imposed against fifteen-year-old William Wayne 
Thompson satisfied the ―evolving standards of decency‖ standard.61  
Examining legislative provisions and the actions of juries in the 
preceding forty years,
62
 as well as noting the less developed minds of 
such young defendants,
63
 the Court determined that sentencing those 
under sixteen years old to death was out of step with civilized norms 
of a maturing society.
64
 However, the very next year, the Court 
upheld the same sentence for two different teens, a sixteen-year-old 
boy from Missouri, Heath Wilkins, and a seventeen-year-old 
Kentucky teen, Kevin Stanford.
65
 Deciding that their sentences were 
 
 58. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and 
the Conservative „Backlash‟, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447 (2003); Barry C. Feld, Unmitigated 
Punishment: Adolescent Criminal Responsibility and LWOP Sentences, 10 J.L. FAM. STUD. 11, 
68 (2007); see also Perry Moriarty & William Carson, Cognitive Warfare and Young Black 
Males in America, 15 IOWA J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. (2012) (describing the 1990s ―super-
predator war‖ against young men of color within the juvenile and criminal justice systems) 
(forthcoming—draft on file with author). 
 59. See Moriarity & Carson, supra note 58. 
 60. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (reviewing sentence of child 
who, in 1984, had been sentenced to death for a crime committed when he was fifteen-years-
old).  
 61. Id. at 821–23. 
 62. Id. at 823–33. 
 63. Id. at 833–37. 
 64. Id. at 823. 
 65. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
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in line with modern understandings of decency, the Court declined to 
extend the Eighth Amendment bar against imposition of the death 
penalty for those between sixteen and eighteen years of age.
66
 
It appears, however, that we have turned a page in the story of 
juvenile justice in this country. Over the last decade, the Court has 
revisited its thinking of child sentencing practices. Now, its 
assessment is informed not only by legal considerations—like 
statutory changes and jury findings—but social scientific evidence 
that provides more concrete proof of the developmental concerns 
hinted at by the Court in Thompson. 
In 2005, in a case involving yet another Missouri child, 
Christopher Simmons—perhaps suggesting that Missouri has been 
one the harshest outliers in youth sentencing practices—the Supreme 
Court finally ruled that executing anyone under eighteen violated the 
Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual.
67
 In Roper v. Simmons, the 
Court again applied the evolving standards of decency doctrine, 
finding that the tide had turned: Emerging morality—not only in this 
country but internationally—abhors such treatment of children.68 In 
what many consider a watershed moment in the evolving story of 
juvenile justice in America, the Court held that youth are 
categorically less culpable than adults.
69
 Given their still maturing 
and developing brains, susceptibility to pressure from others, and 
lack of strongly formed character traits, the traditional rationales for 
sentencing fail to support the execution of anyone under eighteen.
70
 
Taking this analysis to the next level, in 2010, the Court extended 
Roper‘s analysis to youth serving sentences of life without parole 
where they did not kill or intend to kill, noting that ―developments in 
psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental 
differences between juvenile and adult minds.‖71 For some, this was a 
particularly noteworthy doctrinal shift as the Court applied the same 
evolving standards of decency test that previously had been reserved 
 
 66. Id. at 380. 
 67. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 541 (2005). 
 68. Id. at 575. 
 69. Id. at 567. 
 70. Id. at 569. 
 71. Graham v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
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for death penalty cases.
72
 The Court found that requiring youth to 
spend the rest of their natural lives in prison—an extended period of 
imprisonment when compared to sentences of most adults—was 
especially harsh and warranted heightened scrutiny.
73
  
And here is where the authors in this volume enter, into a story 
still very much in progress. Their contributions seek to make greater 
sense of this history, report on juvenile justice practices on the 
ground, and offer theoretical and practical suggestions for youth 
advocates and others in the days ahead.  
In Juvenile Justice After Graham v. Florida: Keeping Due 
Process, Autonomy, and Paternalism in Balance, Kristin Henning 
helps us understand Graham‘s promise for youth and their advocates, 
situating its ―categorically less culpable‖ framing within the larger 
landscape of the history of juvenile justice philosophies. However, 
like Tappan, she identifies pitfalls in creating a class of persons—or 
nonpersons—who in all respects might be seen as incompetent, 
warranting indiscriminate paternalistic interventions. She urges 
careful thinking, contextualization, and nuance in applying the 
teachings of Graham to ensure that we keep our potentially 
competing commitments to legal rights, liberalism, and child 
protection in check.  
Picking up on the themes and warnings offered by commentators 
at time of the juvenile court movement‘s second wave, Tamar R. 
Birckhead shares her concerns about the modern juvenile justice 
system in Delinquent by Reason of Poverty. Despite the 
establishment of due process norms in Gault and emerging thinking 
offered by cases like Graham, Birckhead suggests that for some 
youth—particularly poor youth—juvenile court may still offer the 
―worst of both worlds.‖74 In her rich and convincing account 
Birckhead warns that in making elitist assumptions about the 
meaning of poverty, today‘s justice courts may be unfairly ensnaring 
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destitute youth, actually impeding their development and life 
chances.  
In J.D.B. and the Maturing of Juvenile Confession Suppression 
Law, Martin Guggenheim and Randy Hertz provide an excellent 
account of the unfolding of child interrogation law in the United 
States—including the Supreme Court‘s recent decision in J.D.B. v. 
North Carolina.
75
 J.D.B., they assert, may be ―a game changer in 
delinquency and criminal cases involving minor suspects.‖ 
Analyzing how J.D.B. reflects a particularly noteworthy 
(re)affirmation that ―kids are different,‖ Guggenheim and Hertz 
argue that its application should work to change law enforcement 
practices and require the provision of counsel to young people prior 
to police questioning. 
Lourdes Rosado‘s article, Outside the Police Station: Dealing 
with the Potential for Self-Incrimination in Juvenile Court, takes us 
below the reported-case radar to often doctrinally overlooked 
situations where young people may be called upon within the 
juvenile justice system to incriminate themselves. Rosado counsels 
that these scenarios, usually set in the context of juvenile court‘s 
rehabilitative features such as the intake interview and forensic 
evaluations, call for both litigation and legislative attention. She 
urges lawmakers to revise juvenile and evidence codes to protect 
private and potentially inculpatory information that may be elicited 
by system stakeholders with a view towards assisting accused youth. 
And until then, she urges vigilance on the part of youth advocates, 
calling on them to proactively protect against unnecessary 
disclosures and challenge their affirmative use against 
programmatically compliant clients. 
Providing powerful pictures of continuing philosophic confusion 
in the juvenile justice system, the final articles in this volume 
spotlight systemic practices that may work to degrade and damage 
young people. Yet, these day-to-day practices go largely unnoticed 
by the law and lawyers. In Children in Chains: Indiscriminate 
Shackling of Juveniles, Kim McLaurin offers the views of an 
advocate who has worked to change laws and policies around court 
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and correctional staff‘s use of hand and leg irons on children. 
Providing a survey of various state laws that address the issue, 
McLaurin concludes with some suggestions for reform, in part 
drawing on her law clinic‘s success in helping to change the practice 
of indiscriminate shackling in Massachusetts. 
Finally, Sandra Simkins, with co-authors Dr. Marty Beyer and 
Lisa M. Geis, tackle the issue of solitary confinement for children in 
The Harmful Use of Isolation in Juvenile Facilities: The Need for 
Post-Disposition Representation. Highlighting the importance of 
post-dispositional representation on behalf of youth, they share the 
accounts of young people encountered through the re-entry 
representation work of Simkins‘s legal clinic—children who endured 
the hardship of long-term confinement in isolation without access to 
other youth, educational services, recreation, or outdoor time. 
Simkins and her co-authors offer a call to action and strategies for 
advocates seeking to end such practices. 
These timely articles, and the related symposium for which this 
volume is named, encourage us to continue the conversation about 
these important topics and engage in further thoughtful and zealous 
advocacy on behalf of, and with,
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 juveniles in this country. They 
also set the stage for the next part of our evolution—having looked 
back on Gault‘s impact and considered the implications of Graham‘s 
pronouncements, the thinking and sentiments shared may provide 
clues about what lies ahead. 
In fact, the week this symposium takes place and this volume is 
released, the Supreme Court will hear arguments in Miller v. 
Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs, two cases that seek to clarify the 
meaning of the Graham decision and extend its reasoning in the 
cases of two boys—ages fourteen and fifteen—each of whom were 
sentenced to life without parole for their roles in crimes that 
ultimately resulted in the loss of life.
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in a maturing society surely suggest that sentencing youth to die 
behind bars without the possibility of a second chance is a chapter in 
our history that is ready to be closed. As was urged in 1898, we 
should be done making criminals—forever condemned ones at that—
out of children.
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